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Anti-Reduction in Chemistry
Ryan Miller, Anti-Reduction in Chemistry
The literature reveals two main approaches for denying that the ontology supplied by physics is the only one available to science. First are those advocating supervenience, who treat the ontology of chemistry and the other special sciences as if it were a mathematical formalism: perhaps derivable on its own terms, more useful in some circumstances, and indubitably true, but not expressing any truths about the world which cannot be expressed in the ontology of physics. Second are those advocating downward causation, who in essence believe that physics is incomplete on its own terms: without knowledge derived from the special sciences, they say, predictions about energy transfer will be less restrictive or exact. It is noteworthy that working chemists seem very uncomfortable with both of these approaches. The former ignores the need for chemically-derived constants in so-called ab initio work: if true, it is as yet unproven and unsupported by the scientific evidence. The latter strikes many as redolent of alchemy, and is also notably unproven.
I propose instead that chemistry and physics are genuinely autonomous sciences. This approach demands that both sciences have completely independent ontologies: schema of terms and relations without any overlap. Orbitals, which aren’t part of the ontology of chemistry or that of physics, exist only as a mental posit. Leptons and molecules both exist, but it is meaningless to say that the latter contain some number of the former. This view not only makes sense of the history and mathematics of chemistry (as shown in my presentations at Philopolis Montreal 2011 and 2012), but also treats physics as complete in itself. Chemistry properly speaking, then, can’t make any physical claims about e.g. heat transfer. Much of what chemists do is then defined as physics, but that need not raise any more problems than physicists doing mathematics does, provided the epistemological and ontological claims can be properly extricated. Chemical predictions about physics would be merely heuristic (descriptive rather than purely explanatory). Physics, of course, does condition chemical possibility, but does not determine it (which is consistent with the actual facts about ab initio quantum chemistry).
This paper, unlike my previous efforts, takes its scientific claims as given and instead focuses on working out the philosophical differentiations and implications of such a theory. It seems that the theory is immune to common attacks against strict reduction, supervenience, and downward causation.
Aporias of the Skin
The Aporias of Skin
Mark Cauchi, Rui Pimenta et Wrik Mead
Our joint presentation, comprised of both an artistic and theoretical component, explores the place of silence in the relationship between subjectivity and alterity by focusing on the aporetic function of the skin as the border of interiority and exteriority.
Traditionally, subjectivity is aligned with interiority, and alterity with exteriority. The border of this interiority and exteriority—rarely discussed in the West—is the skin. The history behind this fact has to do with the traditional locating of the soul inside the body and, as Derrida has shown, with the former’s association to silence and the latter’s to the noisy discourse of the world.
But as we intend to discuss and to visualize in our presentation—in dialogue with several classic and contemporary philosophers, theologians, and visual artists (including Augustine, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Nancy, Alberti, Rembrandt, and various anatomists)—the border between interiority and exteriority, between silence and discourse, is more aporetic than the traditional representation suggests. The interior, while seemingly most intimate, secretive, and silent, is in fact quite foreign and alien, as is evident in Vesalius’ early modern etchings of dissections and in Jean-Luc Nancy’s recent discussion of his heart-transplant in L’Intrus. Conversely, the exterior is not simply the space of full disclosure and unhiddeness, for the address to the other always retains some silence in it. The a/poretic structure of skin is that, while it is a porous screen which allows the inside to be projected and secreted to the outside, it also screens, hides, and silently keeps secrets.
These aporias of the skin will be visually represented by Rui Pimenta and Wrik Mead in a large sheet of synthetic skin which will be hung during the talk, like a veil or a screen, between Mark Cauchi, who will be reading his talk, and the audience. On this skin,a video piece by Wrik Mead will shown, along with images from the history of art and antaomy. Seeing skin as a veil or a screen brings to light its dual nature as revealing and concealing, as a screen which hides (screens) and shows (like a screening), as a hide which, once removed, reveals not only the interiority beneath but the skin’s very hiding and projecting function.
Care, from Margin to Centre
Care, from margin to center: Feminist ethics of care and the disabled metaphysical subject.
Catherine Duchastel
One of the goals of feminist care ethics, such as it is elaborated in the work of Gilligan, Noddings, and Tronto (1988, 1984, 1995) is to challenge the definition of the ethical subject used in equality ethics, such as social contract theories, namely one which is autonomous, independent, and equal to other similar subjects. Feminist ethics of care instead develop caring as a central component of any just ethical systems, one that would recognize power inequalities as part of life, and relationships with other subjects as constituting simultaneously the environment and the goal of ethical decisions.
In this presentation I propose a critique of feminist care ethics from a disability studies perspective, one where inquiries about personhood centers on the disability experience and where the disabled subject, characterized by impairment, dependency, and vulnerability, is centrally located within ethics instead of marginally situated. What I propose is missing from feminist ethics of care, is the understanding that disabled subjects are valuable intrinsically, not only relationally to subjects that are non-disabled and positioned as carers. I will explore how redefining a metaphysical subject that is centrally and essentially impaired can lead us to elaborate a better ethical system, without denying the importance of feminist care ethics.
Fits and Starts
Fits and Starts: Hegel, Spinoza and Arendt on the Problem of Beginning
Casey Ford, Daniel Griffin, and Jacob Singer
The problem of where philosophy should begin, and with what proper content, is a necessary question for any philosophical method, yet it has largely vanished from contemporary discourse. The following panel will attempt to resuscitate this question by focusing on the antagonism in the history of philosophy between the necessary beginning in conceptual thought and beginnings in political practice.
1) Daniel Griffin. In his 1812 Science of Logic, Hegel famously emphasizes that philosophy must begin without presuppositions because any assumptions made about important philosophical issues, such as a subject/object distinction and the role of the natural and social sciences in providing practical knowledge, are unfounded and unjustified. Hence for Hegel, philosophy should begin from the most abstract concept, being, and from this point develop necessarily into different categories that constitute the various conceptual relationships between our thought and the world.
2) Casey Ford. At the culmination of the Logic, Hegel critiques Spinoza, perhaps the closest thinker to his own system, for its false beginning with definitions and axioms that are merely posited and not deduced, as well is its result in a system of essentially false movement. Much of the critical response to Hegel’s own beginning hinges precisely on the effects of beginning with abstract concepts, and whether such a point of ‘presuppositionless’ departure can ever escape abstraction in order to provide an account of the concrete world. By turning Spinoza against Hegel, Deleuze and other critics seek to begin with an alternative conception of movement which provide a sufficient account of the becoming of not merely the concepts by which we understand the world, but also of our concrete social and historical world itself.
3) Jacob Singer. Hannah Arendt challenges traditional political theory for its emphasis on the end of the state as oppose to the beginning. According to Arendt, politics proper concerns itself solely with its own constitutional beginning. Unlike Hegel, Arendt does not concern herself with the concept of beginning for the sake of establishing a presuppositionless science, but rather because a beginning signifies unpredictable possibilities essential for the vitality and continuation of the state.
Introducing Ubuntu
Introducing Ubuntu
Mike Nicholson
We will be introducing Campus Ubuntu. We are a group striving to include and educate all people towards a new life philosophy that celebrates diversity as a positive thing. Understanding that our differences actually make us stronger, we can learn to cherish our interdependencies and view all people and opinions with compassion and respect. We expect to hold a discussion about the importance of this approach for current philosophical or social issues, and will encourage the variety of different viewpoints to contribute to developing a more diverse and representative ethos.
The actions taken by Campus Ubuntu at the University of Guelph to address these issues have included weekly discussions about important issues, which we hope to include in our activity/presentation. Only through seriously and positively confronting our differences will we ever begin to understand these issues and learn to view them as positive elements for humanity. This group remains open to people of all religious and cultural backgrounds, but continues to invite those with secular and scientific insights, as well as people trying to represent animal and environmental rights. Campus Ubuntu has also hosted many successful campus events, including the 2011 Fall semester Flash Dance Mob during Peace Week. The goal was again to literally celebrate our own diversities as the most important tool for bringing greater peace both on our campus and throughout the world. We are also going to be contributing to various events during the 2012 Winter semester, including a public discussion asking the ‘big questions’ and also a lecture about adopting ubuntu philosophy for Sustainability Week.
Philosophy in Feminism, and Feminism in Philosophy
Philosophy in Feminism and Feminism in Philosophy
Karen Wendling
Modern feminism and philosophy intersect in two ways.
First, there are philosophical issues in feminism, such as: equality: what does it mean? how do we know how near to or far from it we are? what kind(s) of equality should we aim for? what's necessary to achieve it? discrimination: what is it? how do we prevent it? can someone discriminate without intending to? rights and justice: what rights do women have? what rights should they have? do women and men have different duties? should crimes against women be considered hate crimes? what is a woman? is it fixed by biology, or is it partly culturally determined? what is the difference between sex and gender? can -- or should -- natural differences be overcome? the relationship between feminism and the other equality-seeking movements: is feminism a white woman's movement? are all feminists lesbians? should they be? is feminism less important than ending racism, colonialism, imperialism, globalization, or climate change? what counts as "work" or "labour": are housework and child rearing forms of work? should they be counted in a country's GNP or GDP?
Second, there are feminist issues in philosophy, such as ethics: does child rearing involve moral issues? is autonomy a relational concept? theories of knowledge: do they exclude women's ways of knowing? do child rearing, housework, and what Marx called "reproductive labour" involve forms of knowledge? can traditional theories of knowledge recognize these as forms of knowledge? theories of the structure of reality: what did de Beauvoir meant when she said, “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”? was she right? are sex and gender socially constructed or are they natural in some sense? what do we mean by "natural"? philosophy of science: can there be a feminist science? what would it look like? would it be better or worse science?
I'll talk about these generally, and then we can discuss how philosophy might be useful to feminism, and how feminism has been useful to philosophy.
What is Philosophy Anyway?
What is philosophy, anyway?
Diana Karbonowska
What is philosophy anyway? What did it mean to the Greeks and what does it mean now? In the spirit of Philopolis and its mandate, I intend on expounding the nature of “philosophy” with the general public. I will begin by presenting the etymology of the word and relating it to the notion of a “life of philosophy” according to Plato. This topic originated from a paper I wrote on the notion of “taking a stand” in Plato’s Apology as it relates to the notions of “the unexamined life is not worth living” and courage. In this paper, I argued that the philosophy was actually a way of life as opposed to a study per se. It is important to discuss what Plato may have had in mind when he coined the word, for this set the stage for the future of the discipline. Moreover, it is beneficial to discuss these ideas with the general public in order to expunge the caricature of a reputation with which philosophy as a discipline has developed. This conference presentation is aimed at, on the one hand, highlighting certain aspects of ancient Greek philosophy, Plato (whom some say is the father of western philosophy), and on the other hand, allowing the audience to engage in discussion concerning their preconceived notion, assumptions and postulations.